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Too many accounting systems are built on Theory X
principles; they emphasize unfavorable variances
rather than the favorable. The psychological result:
budget exaggeration and employee dishonesty—

DO ACCOUNTING REPORTS
REINFORCE FAILURE ?
by Letricia Gayle Rayburn

Memphis State University

Accountants are beginning to
question the traditional as
sumptions about employees’ behav
ior in business organizations. These
behavioral assumptions are re
flected in the methods used for in
ternal reporting; should they be
changed? More and more accoun
tants are beginning to give atten
tion to the impact of the processes
of measuring and reporting on peo
ple and organizations.
Traditional accounting model

The traditional accounting mod
el reflects Theory X, which consid
ers workers as being motivated
solely by economic forces. Theory
X also assumes that people are
innately lazy and interested in do
ing as little work as possible. Since
under this style of leadership
workers are perceived to be ordi
narily inefficient and wasteful, tight
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budgets and controls are consid
ered necessary. There is a strong
emphasis on the use of accounting
as an instrument in the process of
reducing and controlling costs.
Under this model the source of
management authority is the for
mal organization chart and the job
title.
These underlying ideas about
human nature were reflected in
Frederick W. Taylor’s scientific
management movement, which con
sidered the employee as an addi
tional part of the machine. Taylor
was interested in maximizing the
productivity of the worker through
increased efficiency and reduced
costs. The scientific management
movement flourished and rapidly
became an important part of the
business enterprise scene; many of
Taylor’s views are widely accepted
today. Taylor and his successors
studied factory costs in detail and

stimulated the development of
modern cost and management ac
counting. Administrative manage
ment theory with its emphasis on
control and segmental responsibil
ity and accountability also affected
this development.1
This scientific method created
many repetitive unmotivating jobs.
As a result, in many large industrial
plants today there is much inatten
tion and conscious motivation to do
a bad job. The workers are often
bored and think of new destructive
ways to break the monotony of the
system. Persons with low intelli
gence and low creative ability usu
ally find assembly line work ac
ceptable; however, many people in
these jobs are underemployed.
1—Caplan, Edwin H., “Behavioral As
sumptions of Management Accounting,”
The Accounting Review, July, 1966, p.
501.
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Of every six men in production, five report job tension.

Accountants have contributed to
the assembly line problem by over
emphasizing short-run unit costs.
The cost of absenteeism and turn
over is not determined but is al
located and hidden in general over
head. If the work environment
causes the worker to turn to alco
hol and drugs for his stimulation,
the long-run cost to the organiza
tion and society is much higher.
If accountants agree that the
major purpose of managerial ac
counting is to provide the various
levels of administration with data
that will facilitate decision making,
they must also be certain that per
formance measurement is not dis
torted. Employees can develop
many ingenious ways of falsifying
accounting reports. It is often done
in an organizational climate of fear
and distrust in order to protect the
employee. Employees can justify, to
themselves at least, this falsification
of accounting records if they be
lieve the reporting system is un
fair.
A variation of this is often seen
in the recurring cycle of govern
mental and business budgets. The
comparison of performance against
the budget influences the next
budget. In cases where the expen
diture was less than the amount
budgeted, there is a tendency to re
vise the subsequent budget down
ward. In other cases where the ex
penditure exceeds the budgeted
amount, the manager is criticized
and often penalized. It usually will
take a manager only one cycle to
recognize “the rules of this game.”
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As a result, managers will engage
in a spending spree the last few
weeks of an appropriation year to
avoid being cut down the next
year. This cycle occurs because
budgets overemphasize specialized
departments and not the total or
ganization.
Only one out of six men in the
labor force of the United States re
ports being free of tension on the
job. Some of this tension is mild
enough to be taken in stride. But
for other people the tensions are
severe enough to impose great
costs for both the person and the
business organization in which he
is employed. Role conflicts consti
tute a major source of such ten
sions.2
Incompatible expectations

The accountant is very often
caught between two different de
mands where two people or groups
put conflicting pressures on him to
make a decision in favor of the ac
tion that they each desire. This ex
posure to incompatible expecta
tions is often experienced by the
accountant in the budgeting proc
ess. Production personnel usually
feel that the accountant should not
make the budget contain such tight
controls while top management usu
ally feels that the budget contains
too much buffer. Accountants rec
ognize the conflicting position in
which they are placed and often
2—Kahn, Robert L., Donald M. Wolfe,
Robert P. Quinn, and J. Diedrick Snoek,
Organizational Stress: Studies in Role
Conflict and Ambiguity, New York, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.,. 1964, p. 55.

they become defensive about their
work. They will use their technical
accounting language to confuse
the production personnel. The in
ability of the factory personnel to
understand this language gives the
accountant a false sense of security.
Problems in reporting

The reporting of unfavorable va
riances causes further breakdowns
in the communication chain. The
reasons for the unfavorable vari
ances are often not published along
with the results. For instance, sup
pose the foreman of Department A
has used more material than the
standard specifications allowed be
cause the purchasing department
has ordered a cheaper grade of
material than the standard speci
fied. The accountant will then
show an unfavorable material
quantity variance for Department
A and the foreman is penalized.
The traditional practice in ac
counting is to practice manage
ment by exception; however, many
times the exception is defined as
showing only unfavorable vari
ances rather than also showing
exceptionally high favorable vari
ances. The emphasis is on punish
ment rather than a combination
of reward and punishment. The
worker who is striving for high ef
ficiency may become quite anxious
because management by exception
highlights only his mistakes. He
may find himself preoccupied with
the number of times he had un
favorable variances rather than his
performance level over the long
29

The emphasis is on

punishment rather than a
combination of reward and
punishment. The worker who
is striving for high efficiency

may become quite anxious

because management by

exception highlights only his

mistakes. He may find

himself preoccupied with the

People of limited intelligence may find assembly line work
satisfactory; however, many are really "underemployed."

run. Too little attention has been
given to the effects of failure on
people. An employee who is highly
interested in his work may suffer
unnecessarily when deficiencies in
his cost center are highlighted,
especially if these are deficiencies
over which he had no control. In
order to resolve this personal con
flict, he may doubt the validity of
the standard or budget manage
ment has set.3

number of times he had
unfavorable variances rather

Participative budgeting process

than his performance level

Since a crucial problem in budg
et administration is obtaining ac
ceptance of the budgets from em
ployees, more companies should
experiment with a participative
budgeting process. The budget’s
influence on motivation may be
more effective if the budget is not
imposed. Many organizations have
found that the best way to gain ac
ceptance is to have the supervisors
all participate in the making of the
budgets that affect them. There is
evidence that participation in
budget making in connection with
the comparison and reviewing
process may lead to increased goal
acceptance by the participants.

over the long run . . .

3—Bernberg, Jacob G., and Raghu Nath,
“Implications of Behavioral Science for
Managerial Accounting,” The Accounting
Review, July, 1967, p. 478.
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Participation in the budgetary con
trol system strives to get the par
ticipants ego-involved, not just
task-involved. In addition to the
better operation of the company,
a real value of participation at all
management levels is the psycho
logical values that accrue. A high
degree of participation leads to
better morale and greater initia
tive. Participation can reduce re
sistance as employees feel that the
budget is their idea now and not
just management’s idea. Participa
tion in the budgeting process often
causes the employees to become
personally committed to the con
trol system.4
Often management wants its em
ployees to believe that it solicits
their suggestions when, in fact, it
desires only false participation.
Such attitudes soon filter down the
line to the employees; this ap
proach is no better than the im
posed budget approach. Manage
ment may realize that this half
hearted acceptance is risky and in
order to ensure its position it may
request the signatures of the ac
ceptors so that they cannot later
deny they accepted it.
Letting employees participate in
the budgeting process may not be
4—Wallace, Michael E., “Behavioral Con
siderations in Budgeting,” Management
Accounting, August, 1966, p. 6.
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the best solution for all organiza
tions. Management must ask itself
if the personality and history of
the group is conducive to partici
pation. Employees will likely in
fluence the decisions so they be
come less threatening to them;
extra slack may be built in the
budget so it will be easier to meet.
In order to contribute to the budg
et-making process employees must
be informed of important influ
encing factors. Additionally, top
management must decide if it is
open to flexibility and is willing to
accept the decisions jointly made
by employees and managers.
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The true success of any budget
ary system depends upon its ac
ceptance by all company members
who are affected by the budget. If
the participation process is con
ducted properly, it should build
acceptance of the budget by those
persons responsible for meeting it.
The accountant should not view
his function as primarily one of
criticizing the actions of others, in
stead he should demonstrate that
he is willing to revise their budget
whenever experience indicates that
it is necessary.
Conclusion

Accounting reports should give
greater emphasis to favorable per
formance. Not only should man
agement be made aware of poor
performance, but also it should
have the information available for
rewarding efficient production.
More thought should be given to
the effects of failure on the organ
ization’s participants so that ac
counting measurements do not
pave the way for additional failure.

If management launches
participative budgeting, it

must be sincere. Employees
must be informed of

important influencing factors
affecting the budget. Top

management must decide it

is really willing to accept the
decisions jointly made by

employees and managers.

Employees, living in a climate of fear and distrust,
can find many ways of falsifying accounting reports.
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